Economic Due Process and the Perservation of Competition by Wonnell, Christopher T.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 11
Number 1 Fall 1983 Article 4
1-1-1983
Economic Due Process and the Perservation of
Competition
Christopher T. Wonnell
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Perservation of Competition, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 91 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol11/iss1/4
Economic Due Process and the
Preservation of Competition
By CHRISTOPHER T. WONNELL*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ........................................... 92
A. Classification of Economic Regulations: The Lochner
Experience ............................................. 93
B. Monopoly Legislation and the Interests of Consumers .. 97
H. A Model of the Legislative Process .................. 100
A. Assumptions Underlying the Model .................... 100
B. Monopoly Legislation and the Political Process ......... 103
1. Direct Effects upon Voting .......................... 103
2. Stimulus to Political Activity ........................ 106
3. Information Available to Legislators ................ 107
C. Process Considerations in Judicial Review .............. 108
III. Individual Rights and the Free Competition for
Lawful Occupations ................................... 111
A. Commercial Speech .................................... 112
B. "Dormant" Commerce Clause .......................... 115
C. Noncommercial Speech ................................ 118
1. Self-Expression ..................................... 118
2. Marketplace of Ideas ............................... 120
3. Checking Governmental Abuse ..................... 123
D. The Vested Rights Provisions: Government Taking and
Contract Impairment ................................... 125
E. Free Competition and the Due Process Clause .......... 127
IV. Countervailing State Interests ........................ 129
A. Protecting the Producer ................................ 130
B. Protecting the Consumer ............................... 132
V. Conclusion ............................................ 133
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego; B.A., 1979, Northwestern Uni-
versity; J.D., 1982, University of Michigan.
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I. Introduction
Moderation has not characterized economic due process jurispru-
dence.' The Supreme Court's response to the excessive interventionism
of the Lochner2 era was to abandon meaningful scrutiny of economic
legislation under the Due Process Clause Ironically, however, the in-
discriminate withdrawal from any type of economic due process review
may have frustrated the goals a more limited retrenchment could have
furthered. The old constitutional doctrine did protect vested interests
from effective popular control. On the other hand, it also safeguarded
the process of open competition, and thereby protected popular control
from the possibility that concentrated interests might use the state as a
tool to secure enforceable monopoly privileges for themselves.
This Article contends that the Supreme Court's virtual abandon-
ment of economic due process scrutiny of statutes that enforce monop-
olistic conditions upon lawful occupations was an unnecessary and
improper step. The term "occupation" is defined broadly to include
any position from which one produces something of economic value in
the marketplace, and therefore encompasses any lawful trade, business,
or profession.' The thesis is that courts should recognize that free and
open competition for society's lawful occupations is a constitutional
value. As such, legislation can infringe upon that value only if the state
can present sufficient justification for imposing monopolistic conditions
upon an occupation.
For example, legislation might be justified where the government
rationally concludes that a reliance interest created by pre-existing mo-
nopoly should be protected or that monopoly conditions are necessary
1. This Article uses the term "economic due process" to refer to the application of the
Due Process Clause to the substantive content of economic legislation.
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum hours legislation for bakers
contravenes economic due process).
3. In theory, the statute still must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose in order to comport with due process. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court's willingness to postulate hypothetical purposes which
a given statute conceivably might further has led to a defacto abandonment of substantive
judicial review of economic legislation under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Williamson
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
4. Thus, "occupation" is used in a broader sense than Professor Tribe's "vocation."
Tribe argues that the federal Constitution should protect "a fair opportunity for an individ-
ual to realize her identity in a chosen vocation." See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-14, at 953 (1978). His concern is the self-identity value, and for that purpose a
narrower definition is appropriate. In this Article, the more encompassing definition is em-
ployed because values other than self-identity are involved-in particular, the social utility
and countervailing power of the competitive process. See infra text accompanying notes
156-85.
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to counteract other concentrations of bargaining power. In such cir-
cumstances, the court should defer to the legislative judgment concern-
ing the comparative evils.' When new legislation suppresses the
process of open competition for a purpose other than protecting a reli-
ance interest or counteracting defects in bargaining power, the courts
should scrutinize closely each purported justification for the legislation.
The judiciary should declare such statutes unconstitutional unless they
are in fact necessary to further a state interest of overriding importance.
In this Article, the class of suspect laws is defined to include stat-
utes that exhibit either of two features. The statutes may constitute
governmental sanctioning of horizontal agreements to fix prices or
other terms of sale that would be per se illegal under the anti-trust laws
if undertaken by private parties without such sanction. Legislative en-
actments of this type expressly prohibit members of an occupation
from offering some more favorable term of trade to the consuming
public. Alternatively, monopolistic statutes may condition participa-
tion in an occupation upon rules of conduct that are either facially non-
uniform with respect to new entry or are so disproportionately benefi-
cial in fact to identifiable existing members of the occupation that they
betray a protectionist purpose.
A. Classification of Economic Regulations: The Lochner Experience
Any constitutional analysis of economic liberty in the United
States must begin with the Lochner heritage. Commentators, of course,
have criticized sharply this historical application of economic due pro-
cess concepts. 6 Unfortunately, the Court's withdrawal from any mean-
ingful scrutiny of economic regulation has been broader than valid
objections to Lochner era jurisprudence would justify.
The tendency to treat all regulations that are in some sense "eco-
nomic" as embodying similar constitutional interests has generated a
good deal of confusion. Clarity of analysis can be improved if Lochner
era cases are viewed in the context of at least three distinct classes of
economic regulation.
The first class is the set of statutes designed to remedy perceived
defects in economic bargaining power. The judiciary struck down
many statutes in this class during the Lochner era, including, of course,
the maximum hours legislation reviewed in the Lochner case itself.
5. See infra notes 7-11, 215-19 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 285 (1973); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST 14-15 (1980).
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The Supreme Court invalidated a statute banning "yellow dog" con-
tracts in which employees promised to refrain from joining a union as a
condition of their obtaining employment.7 It held that a minimum
wage law for certain groups of workers was unconstitutional.8 The
Court also indicated a willingness to invalidate public utility regula-
tions that set unreasonably low prices.9
Almost certainly influenced in part by decisions such as these,
Robert McCloskey made the following comments about the Lochner
era:
There is no way of estimating reliably the restraining effect of this
cloud of negativisms on state legislators and congressmen who
might otherwise have made haste more speedily along the road to
the welfare state. No doubt the pace of social change was moder-
ated; a respectable number of "excesses" were prevented; a re-
spectable amount of money was saved for the businessman; a
good many laborers were left a little hungrier than they might
ave been if the Court had not been there to defend economic
liberty.'
Of course, some commentators never accepted this conclusion."
The second class of statutes consists of laws that directly regulate
purportedly undesirable business practices. In this class, the Court in-
validated a statute that permitted a "tolerance" of only two ounces in
excess of the minimum weight of a loaf of bread on the ground that the
Court believed it was impossible to manufacture good bread without
frequently exceeding the prescribed tolerance.' 2 A statute that sought
to regulate employment agencies' fee collection practices failed to sur-
vive judicial scrutiny.'3 Other statutes suffering the same fate included
a law that forbade the use of "shoddy" in the manufacture and sale of
bedding'4 and a zoning ordinance that placed an individuars business
and industrial buildings within a residential zone, diminishing the
7. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
8. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
9. See, e.g., Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
10. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 151 (1960).
11. See, e.g., L. VON MisEs, HUMAN ACTION 615, 620 (3d ed. 1949) (It is a "distortion of
facts" to state that sweatshop factory conditions worsened the lives of workers, especially
women and children. To the contrary, the availability of these marginally profitable oppor-
tunities saved the workers "in the strict sense of the term, from death by starvation."). See
also T. SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES 110-11 (1981) (The presence of employment
opportunities entailing long hours of work provided a necessary foothold for ethnic
immigrants.).
12. Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
13. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). Because of its labor law context, the statute
might also be viewed as purporting to redress defects in bargaining power.
14. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
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value of the property on which they were located. 15 In these cases, the
Supreme Court's willingness to second guess the legislature's judgment
about the appropriate degree of regulation of business practices earned
the Court the reputation of behaving as a "superlegislature."' 6 The
modern Court maintains it has abandoned this role.' 7
The third class of economic regulation imposes monopoly or cartel
conditions upon individual occupations. These laws fix supracompeti-
tive prices or exclude entry into an occupation. Statutes in this class
erect barriers to entry either by discriminating on their face against new
entrants or by conferring benefits upon members of an occupation dis-
proportionate to the indirect improvement in the business practices
purportedly sought by the legislature.'" In what is often regarded as
the beginning of the Lochner era,"' the Court struck down a statute that
prohibited out-of-state marine insurance companies from insuring any
property located inside the state.20 Later, a statute failed to survive
judicial scrutiny where it forbade a corporation from owning any drug
store in Pennsylvania unless all stockholders were licensed pharma-
cists, but expressly excepted any stores already owned and operated at
the time the statute was enacted.2' The Lochner Court invalidated a
Texas law making it a misdemeanor for a person to act as a railway
15. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
16. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
17. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). The Court held a
statute prohibiting anyone other than licensed optometrists or opthamologists from fitting or
duplicating lenses did not violate economic due process. In doing so, the Court stated, "The
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . .to strike down state laws,
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." Id. at 488.
18. The distinction between laws regulating business entry and laws regulating business
practices was drawn by Grady, Commentary, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULA-
TION 155 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1980). Grady argues that determinations about the appropriate
regulation of business practices require more economic expertise than do similar determina-
tions about the regulation of business entry.
19. See B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 110-13 (1980).
20. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Although Allgeyer often is included in
Lochner era discussions, see, e.g., B. SIEGAN, supra note 19, at 110, it does not belong in that
category of discredited decisions. Professor Gunther almost admits as much in G. GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 510 (10th ed. 1980) (emphasis ad-
ded): "Soon after the turn of the century, the expansive conception of "liberty" in Allgeyer
bore fruit in more controversial contexts, exemplified by the Lochner case. . . .When the
modern Court looks back to the discredited "Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitu-
tional doctrine." . . . The 4llgeyer reference is not to its specfc insurance setting but to its
signocance in opening the door to substitution of the Justices' notions of public policy and
fundamental values for legislative choices regarding economic and social regulation, as as-
sertedly took place in Lochner."
21. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
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passenger conductor without having had two years' experience as a
freight conductor or brakeman.2 2 The Court also found unconstitu-
tional a law that prohibited anyone from entering the ice industry with-
out first acquiring a "certificate of convenience and necessity," and that
denied such certificates unless the prospective entrant could demon-
strate that existing service was not "sufficient to meet the public
needs.
'23
One can agree with Justice Holmes' comment, dissenting in Loch-
ner, that a legislature's apparent lack of wisdom in passing a given stat-
ute "has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law."' 4 Nevertheless, one need not be chronically cynical
to question whether the statutes in this third class of legislation are
passed primarily because the majority of citizens are of the opinion that
these statutes promote the public interest.2"
As is argued in greater detail below, statutes of this type owe their
existence primarily to the organized power of special interest groups,
and are passed irrespective of whether the majority of citizens approve
of them and despite the fact that the majority often will be harmed by
them. In short, this Article contends that statutes conferring monopo-
listic privileges have survived largely because of the negative reaction
to the invalidation of laws in the other two classes.26 The next section
will analyze the economic consequences that have followed from the
Court's deference to the judgments of legislatures regarding this third
class of economic regulation.
22. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
23. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 272 (1932). The ice industry actively
supported the legislation. As Bernard Siegan has noted, "Brandeis's [dissenting] opinion,
which outweighed (31-10 pages) and outpointed (55-0 footnotes) his opponent's, also dealt
much more with economic theory than did Sutherland's. But it reflected a perspective that
would find limited favor among economists today." B. SIEGAN, supra note 19, at 133. The
poor were the primary beneficiaries of the decision, since they relied upon inexpensive ice to
meet their refrigeration needs during the Depression. Id. at 138.
24. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. Professor Hayek distinguishes between the particular "will" and the general "opin-
ions" of the majority or their representatives. As defined by Hayek, "opinions" are broader
perceptions about what is just conduct. By definition, all acts of the majority's representa-
tives reflect their "will," but Hayek argues that special interest pressures force those repre-
sentatives to act contrary to their own "opinions." See 3 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY 2-8 (1979).
26. An example ofjudicial deference to monopolistic legislation of this type is Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), in which the Court upheld a law prohibiting nonlawyers
from competing with lawyers in the business of debt adjustment.
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B. Monopoly Legislation and the Interests of Consumers
In an unregulated private market, firms have an incentive to col-
lude in order to raise prices or diminish the quality of service without
incurring competitive losses.27 Once cartel arrangements are made,
however, each firm has an incentive to "cheat" on the compact in order
to divert business away from rivals still adhering to the agreement.28
High cartel prices or poor cartel service also tend to attract the entry of
new firms into the market, which may erode the cartel arrangement or
lead to excess capacity in the industry.
The government can be highly useful to a cartel. For example, it
can punish price "chisellers" and coercively discourage new entrants.29
Cartel conditions are inefficient and detrimental to the consuming pub-
lic, however, because cartels tend to raise prices above marginal cost
and reduce the quality of service.30
One common form of maintaining cartel conditions is the occupa-
tional license. It has been argued that licensing is justified because it
provides consumers with useful information about product quality.3 It
should be noted initially that the theoretical foundation for that argu-
ment is somewhat weak32 and a review of the empirical evidence sug-
gests that the claim is largely rationalization.3 Thus, any information
27. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATION 357-58 (2d ed. 1980).
28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id at 344-46. The victims of licensing lose more than its beneficiaries gain because
of the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.
31. See Leffier, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine,
J. LAW & ECON. 165, 172 (1978). Leffier discusses three possible arguments for licensing-
costly information, consumption externalities, and "society knows best." In response to the
first argument, Leffler concludes that certification is the better alternative, since it provides
all the information of licensing while offering a wider set of choices. Id. at 186. The second
argument involves products that harm nonpurchasers, such as automobiles. In these cases,
the state interest in licensing may be greater, although the argument for licensing only new
entrants into the occupation remains suspect. The "society knows best" objection is dis-
cussed supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
32. See T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 128 (1980). Sowell notes that profit
incentives will insure the production of high quality, high priced items when the benefit of
the quality improvement is cost-justified. Id Although this point has some merit, it is not
decisive. The market may underproduce information about product quality, since it is diffi-
cult to prevent competing firms from obtaining information available to the public and then
using it to copy product innovations. Even if licensing creates some informational benefits,
it also inhibits competition. This result is undesirable because competition tends to improve
the quality of the product, absent a public utility condition. See Barron, Business and Pro-
fessionalLicensing-Calfornia, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 658 (1966).
33. Rottenberg, Introduction, in LICENSURE, supra note 18, at 7-8:
"There is a fairly substantial literature on the economics of occupational licensing,
most of which appears in the professional economic journals. The consensus of
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generated is likely to be inaccurate.34
Even if in its infancy a licensing agency is committed to protecting
the consumer, there is good reason to believe that it will ultimately see
its role as protecting the occupation it purports to regulate.3 5 Of course,
there will be exceptional situations in which consumer ignorance is so
serious that licensing is the only solution. If the Court employed a
moderate standard of economic due process review, a state could suc-
cessfully argue that such unusual circumstances make a particular li-
censing statute necessary.
It is significant that even if licensing did convey valuable informa-
tion about some occupations, the same information can be provided
directly by the less restrictive means of certification.36 Even under a
certification system, some consumers will act irrationally, despite hav-
ing access to the necessary information. The real issue, therefore, is
one of comparative distrust. It is one thing to claim that private citizens
often make mistaken economic decisions; it is quite another to assert
that the judgments of private citizens who have been given access to the
relevant information are systematically less rational and trustworthy on
issues implicating their own welfare than the judgments of state offi-
cials. A licensing law could always be justified under a constitutional
doctrine that postulates imperfect citizens but omniscient, benevolent
state officials. Strong arguments, however, negate comparative trust of
that literature can be summarized in the following statements: occupational licens-
ing is primarily promoted by practitioners of the occupation rather than by con-
sumers of its services. Licensing primarily serves the interests of practitioners
rather than the interests of consumers."
34. Political competition generates less accurate information and more exaggerated
claims than does economic competition. See T. SOWELL, supra note 32, at 144. Although
Sowell does not state clearly the reason for this phenomenon, a likely explanation is that
only exaggerated appeals can reach the consciousness of those who lack a strong incentive to
maintain an interest in making political decisions. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
35. T. SOWELL, supra note 32, at 195. According to Sowell, "[o]nce a rationale for
regulation has been created, the actual behavior of regulatory agencies does not follow that
rationale or its hoped-for results, but adjusts to the institutional incentives and constraints
facing the agencies." Id. The result is that agencies created for other purposes eventually
protect incumbent special interests that have enough at stake to pay the high costs of contin-
uously monitoring an agency's activities. Id. at 191.
36. See W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 147-
48 (1956): "The distinction between optional certification and compulsory licensing is obvi-
ous. The former does not exclude anyone from a calling or business; it simply precludes his
mislabeling himself. Occupational licensing does more. It prevents anyone's engaging in
the regulated activity until a somewhat inaccessible license has first been obtained, and thus
narrows the numbers of those who, under whatever name, may share in the business to be
done. . . . Optional certification meets the public need fairly in a great many fields."
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the state both as a factual matter37 and as an integral assumption of the
constitutional scheme.
A general resistance to theories based upon comparative distrust of
the citizenry need not lead one to embrace the extreme position that
paternalistic considerations can never be legitimate state interests. If
the Court were to invalidate a monopoly statute, the state would retain
the power to regulate business practices directly or ban the product
from the marketplace. Furthermore, the state could exercise this power
even if its purpose is solely paternalistic. The Court, however, should
not presume that the Legislature intended to assert its distrust of the
citizenry merely because it passed a law enforcing a monopoly. By re-
turning consideration of such issues to the Legislature, the Court can
insure that "governmental action [that] trenches upon values that may
reasonably be regarded as fundamental. . .[is] the product of a delib-
erate and broadly based political judgment.
39
A more active judicial review of monopoly statutes almost cer-
tainly would be in the economic interest of consumers. Whether such
an economic benefit comprises an interest of constitutional dimension
is the subject of the remainder of this Article. Section II contends that
the Court's process oriented approach to constitutional rights requires
judicial scrutiny of monopoly legislation. Section III argues that judi-
cial deference to this class of economic regulation is inconsistent with
the treatment accorded other constitutional rights. Finally, Section IV
identifies state interests that the Court should consider sufficient to
override the anti-monopoly value.
37. Two considerations weaken the rationality of political decisionmaking. First, un-
like market transactions, there is no one-to-one correspondence between individual choice
and final action. A citizen cannot be certain that her political decision will have any effect
upon final outcomes; this uncertainty reduces her incentive to make that decision carefully.
Second, in the political process, the responsibility for poor choices does not rest directly
upon the chooser. Therefore, the feedback that might have punished irrational choices and
rewarded rational ones will be less than that present in market transactions. See J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 36-39 (1962).
38. Professor Blasi argues against prior restraints in the free speech area on similar
grounds. He concedes that speakers and listeners may behave irrationally. Blasi contends,
however, that the issue is one of comparative trust and asserts that any assumption that in
the speech area the state will act systematically less irrationally than the citizenry is contrary
to the central assumption of limited government at the very core of the Constitution. See
Blasi, Towarda Theory afPrior Restraint: The CentralLinkage, 66 MINN. L. Rav. 11, 69-73
(1981). The analogy between free speech and occupational freedom is pursued further infra
notes 140-85 and accompanying text.
39. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1188 (1977)
(The Supreme Court's role is to remand ill-considered judgments implicating fundamental
values to Congress for more complete reflection.).
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II. A Model of the Legislative Process
Before attempting to identify a class of economic statutes that the
courts should scrutinize more closely, it is first necessary to explain why
legislative judgments embodied in those statutes should not be consid-
ered conclusive. If monopoly statutes are passed merely because ma-
jority opinions are in error, the Lochner heritage warns against their
invalidation.4 ° If such statutes are passed because of some perversion
or corruption of the legislative process, the case for judicial review is no
stronger; it is a settled principle of constitutional law that such impro-
prieties do not render an otherwise valid statute unconstitutional.4'
The developing theory of public choice,4" however, postulates cer-
tain conditions under which a properly functioning democratic political
process consistently may thwart majority values. The argument is not
that the complexities and imperfections of real world politics prevent
legislatures from serving the majority. Instead, it is that even an
"ideal" democratic political process may be inherently unable to weigh
the competing values embodied in monopoly legislation. This argu-
ment can be assessed by constructing a simplified model of a properly
functioning political process.
A. Assumptions Underlying the Model
In this model, it is supposed initially that a legislature is consider-
ing a bill that would restrict entry into a particular occupation. One
example might be an occupational licensing statute for barbers43 that
exempts existing barbers under a grandfather clause. Alternatively, the
legislature might fix a minimum price for haircuts at the same level that
would result indirectly from restrictive licensing. Assume that the hy-
40. See supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 207-11 and ac-
companying text.
41. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (statute not unconstitutional
merely because its passage was secured by bribing the legislators).
42. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
43. Barbering is licensed in all states. See Rottenberg, Introduction, in LICENSURE,
supra note 18, at 2. In many states, new barbers cannot receive licenses until they can
demonstrate proficiency in such subjects as physiology, electricity, anatomy, barber history,
and bacteriology. See Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6,
12-13 (1976).
The reader should feel free to substitute "taxicab drivers" or "brain surgeons" for bar-
bers, since an individual's liberty interest should extend to all lawful pursuits. The state's
countervailing interest in regulation may vary, however. See infra notes 214-25 and accom-
panying text. Even in the medical field, it has been argued that licensing serves primarily
the interests of the American Medical Association and its member physicians rather than the
interests of patients. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 149-60 (1962).
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pothetical state consists of three classes of people: producers (barbers),
consumers (people who purchase haircut services), and legislators.
Within the bounds of the law, consumers and producers rationally seek
to maximize their incomes, while legislators rationally seek to maxi-
mize votes.
Some of these assumptions clearly are more realistic than others.
The assumption that producers and consumers seek to maximize their
incomes is, of course, basic economic theory. This assumption does not
require the two classes to be greedy rather than altruistic; even if the
individuals in those classes have altruistic motives, they still need in-
come to enable them to direct resources toward their preferred benefi-
ciaries.' It is assumed, however, that random consumers are not the
desired beneficiaries of producers' altruism and, conversely, that ran-
dom producers are not the desired beneficiaries of consumers'
altruism.
4 5
The assumption that legislators seek to maximize votes may be
more controversial. One might concede that legislators are concerned
with getting votes, but protest the assumption that vote maximization is
their sole motive.4 6 Undoubtedly, legislators are motivated by diverse
goals, including providing assistance to personal or political friends
and furthering a particular ideology. The purpose, however, of postu-
lating this model is to examine the systematic tendencies that a properly
functioning political order will exhibit. Therefore, the relevant ques-
tion is whether these other motives will cause legislators to vote differ-
ently on a bill licensing barbers or other occupations than if the
legislators were interested exclusively in maximizing votes. If the other
motives are not implicated by the specific bills in question, or if they
are likely to influence different legislators in opposite directions, these
other motives may not affect the validity of the hypothesis. Thus, the
assumption that legislators are concerned solely with maximizing votes
44. See McKean, Economics of Trust, Altruism, and Corporate Responsibilit, in ALTRU-
ISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 29 (1975) (constructing a utility frontier that in-
cludes an individual's tastes for conventional goods, as well as her tastes for helping--or
hurting-other individuals).
45. Buchanan and Tullock consider a transaction "economic" if the parties enter into
the arrangement without concern for the welfare of the other transacting party. See J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 37, at 18. See also J. BUCHANAN, FREEDOM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT 44 (1977).
46. For example, Posner argues that the legislature can be viewed as a seller of diverse
entitlements such as tax exemptions, subsidies, and privileges. In return, legislators receive
valuable consideration from the citizenry such as votes, contributions, bribes, and political
activity. SeeR. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 405 (2d ed. 1977). For reasons to be
discussed later, the model in this Article differs from Posner's in that it assumes that both
legislators and citizens act within the bounds of the law at all times.
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simplifies the model without detracting from its usefulness. 47
Two other considerations reinforce the vote maximization assump-
tion. First, legislators who systematically ignore voters in pursuit of
their own visions may find themselves replaced through electoral com-
petition by legislators more sympathetic to the desires of voters.48 Sec-
ond, the vote maximization assumption seems particularly appropriate
in the context of legislation erecting a barrier to enter an occupation.
For example, it seems unlikely that many legislators have rigid ideolog-
ical commitments on the issue of the licensing or nonlicensing of bar-
bers. It is reasonable to assume that legislators rarely will choose to
expend their scarce political capital on such issues, or at least that there
is no strong rationale for legislators to expend such capital consistently
in, one direction rather than another.
Legislative impropriety, such as bribery or corruption through
campaign financing, is not included in this model. The rationale for
omitting legislative impropriety is not that it is an insignificant factor in
the political process. Instead, as noted above,49 such impropriety gen-
erally does not render an otherwise valid statute unconstitutional.
The relatively mundane nature of the issues buttresses the addi-
tional assumption that any citizen who chooses to support a candidate
because of her stance on the licensing of barbers will be doing so for
personal financial reasons. This model might not provide accurate ex-
planations of political behavior for more emotionally charged issues.
On issues such as abortion or food stamps for the poor, other sympa-
thies might overwhelm a rational calculus of self-interest. The assump-
tion is that the licensing of barbers or similar occupations is not such an
issue.
Another assumption in the model is that significantly more people
consume the service being regulated than produce that service. Al-
though there are exceptions, this assumption is generally valid because
our economy is. organized around the principles of specialization and
trade. Consequently, each person generally produces relatively few
47. See Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics in READINGS IN
MICROECONOMICS 23 (W. Breit & H. Hochman eds. 1968), reprintedfrom M. FRIEDMAN,
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953). It should be noted that constitutional theorists gen-
erally have assumed that legislators seek the votes of their constituents in a properly func-
tioning democracy. See, e.g., Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A
Functional Justfication, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 293 (1981) ("[Flor most [elected officials],
few, if any, values rank as high as incumbency.").
48. The perception that such accountability exists is a crucial factor in terms of influence
on behavior. For evidence that Congress believes that election concerns are pre-eminent,
see R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 131, 135 (1967).
49. See supra notes 41, 46 and accompanying text.
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services and consumes relatively many. The next section of the Article
examines the significance of this assumption.
If consumers significantly outnumber producers, a statute that en-
forces a producer-monopoly will affect each producer to a much larger
extent than it affects each consumer.50 For example, a barbers' licens-
ing statute might prevent a fifty cent or one dollar decline in the price
of haircuts that new entry into the occupation would have caused.
Such a decline would be fairly unimportant to a consumer who pays
for less than ten haircuts per year; however, a similar decline would be
of crucial importance to an established barber, who gives thousands of
such haircuts each year. For simplicity, it is arbitrarily assumed that
each consumer's financial interest in the legislation is $20 and each pro-
ducer's stake is $1000. Although the actual numbers could be different,
the vast disparity in the size of the respective interests follows from the
earlier assumption that there are significantly more consumers than
producers of the particular service.'
B. Monopoly Legislation and the Political Process
In determining whether to support a bill that would license bar-
bers, a rational legislator will be influenced by at least three factors.
Her decision may directly affect voting behavior of constituents. Simi-
larly, it may indirectly affect voting behavior by altering levels of polit-
ical activity. Finally, the legislator will be influenced by the
information available to her at the time she makes her decision.
1. Direct Effects upon Voting
One's initial impression might be that a rational legislator will op-
pose such a bill, since its passage would harm significantly more con-
stituents than it would benefit. Two factors, however, suggest a
contrary conclusion.
First, voters must be informed about an issue in order to base their
voting decisions upon its merits. 2 Information, however, is costly in
50. This theory received empirical support in Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market
Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. L. & ECON. 151 (1972).
51. See Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211
(1976).
52. The extent to which the public is aware of political issues is a matter of some dis-
pute. For evidence that the electorate knows little about the issues, see A. CAMPBELL, P.
CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 99-102 (abr. ed. 1964); G.
TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 100-14 (1967). For a positive view of the
rationality of the electorate, see V. 0. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE: RATION-
ALITY IN RESIDENTIAL VOTING 1936-60 (1966).
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money and time to disseminate and to acquire.53 Initially, the voter
must learn that there is a bill before the state legislature to license bar-
bers. Furthermore, the voter must discover that she has an interest in
the bill and what that interest involves. Since most licensing bills con-
tain vague language about protecting the consumer,54 the consumer-
voter must learn that her interest will actually be injured by the law.
Finally, the voter must discover how each legislator voted on the bill.
Based on these considerations, a person with a $1000 stake in a bill will
be much more willing to incur the costs necessary to become in-
formed-and see to it that other similarly minded persons are in-
formed-than will an individual with a $20 stake .5  Therefore, in the
example, it is likely that barbers will be much better informed about
the legislation than consumers. 6
Even if consumers are as fully informed as producers, a second
factor will influence the political process. A rational legislator would
not simply count the number of voters who know they favor licensing
of barbers and the number who know they oppose it. The only voters
whose preferences matter are those who will base their voting decision
on this specific issue.
The decision to vote involves an expenditure of costly time and
may involve a loss of income opportunities. Of course, many citizens
feel strongly that it is their civic duty to vote and will choose to disre-
gard such costs. By definition, however, marginal voters do not feel
that way.57 It would be an unusual voter who would choose not to vote
despite having large stakes in the outcome of the election, but who
would decide to vote if a $20 issue were added to the calculus. By
contrast, a citizen with a $1000 stake in a single bill may believe that all
53. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, FROM GALBRAITH TO ECONOMIC FREEDOM 41 (1977) (ra-
tional consumer-voter would spend no more than two cents to inform himself on how to
vote regarding a tariff on shoes).
54. See W. GELLHORN, supra note 36, at 109 (Those already within the occupational
group always campaign upon the stated ground that the consumer will be protected by
licensing.).
55. Sowell notes that it costs special interest groups less to acquire information about
their own interests. Such groups also have an incentive to invest in discovering which other
groups might be political allies. See T. SOWELL, supra note 32, at 179. See also M. FRIED-
MAN, Who Represents Whom?, in AN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 258 (2d ed. 1975).
56. See W. GELLHORN, supra note 36, at 110-11: "Who is there to resist the endeavors
of the 'ins' to make certain that the 'outs' will remain out? Obviously, those who may in
future find themselves excluded from an occupation, or delayed in their entry into it, are not
yet aware of the difficulties they will face; unorganized and, indeed, unknown, they remain
unrepresented while licensing is debated."
57. See Barzel, Yaram, & Silberberg, Is the Act of Voting Rational?, 16 PUBLIC CHOICE
51, 52 (Fall 1973).
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other issues before the legislature matter less than this one piece of leg-
islation. Thus, an otherwise abstaining citizen indeed may find it ra-
tional to vote when an issue worth $1000 to her is at stake.
Similarly, those citizens who vote in all elections will only concern
the legislator in this model if they will change their voting decision
because of the legislator's position on that specific issue. It would be
rare for other issues in a campaign to be so evenly divided that a single
$20 issue would be the deciding factor; under similar circumstances,
however, a $1000 issue might indeed sway many votes.
58
The above analysis probably would not apply if a legislator advo-
cated an across-the-board repeal of laws erecting barriers to enter an
occupation, together with opposition to all new entry barrier laws. Al-
though this approach would confer substantial benefits upon consum-
ers, it rarely is used. One explanation may be that the political
processes tend to act incrementally.59 Another may be that the injuries
such legislation inflicts are unobtrusive.60 Unlike high taxes, which may
involve a sufficiently visible form of victimization, monopoly statutes
impoverish the public in a subtle manner.61 Indeed, one of the stronger
arguments for recognizing a constitutionally protected economic inter-
est in this area is the need to inject an element of general principle into
a sphere where the process of single-issue politics cannot be trusted to
produce principled results.62
58. This theory of political process is derived in large part from the pioneering work of
George Stigler on the theory of public choice. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
59. Despite observable social trends of some magnitude, the political process often acts
in a piecemeal fashion. See J. BUCHANAN, supra note 45, at 273; M. ROTHBARD, FOR A
NEW LIBERTY 302 (1973) (Change should be advocated in radical form in order for the
political process to move incrementally). Cf. Lindblom, Policy_4nalysis, 48 AM. ECON. REV.
298, 298-312 (1958) (general defense'of incrementalism).
60. Government spending programs exhibit a similar dynamic involving concentrated
beneficiaries and diffuse victims. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 37, at 81.
61. Voters are aware of the effects of high taxes; as a result, legislators can obtain polit-
ical benefits by promising to contain special interests through across-the-board tax cuts. See
Downs, "hy the Government Budget is Too Small in a Democracy, reprinted in PRIVATE
WANTS AND PUBLIC NEEDS 91 (E. Phelps ed. 1965). Legislators, however, may not be able
to obtain such political benefits by promising across-the-board repeal of monopoly statutes.
62. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum ofPrinciple, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 517 (1981). This
Article, however, asserts a different and, in some respects, broader definition of "principle"
than does Dworkin. For Dworkin, principled decisionmaking encompasses the protection of
claims of right or justice that transcend and deliberately contravene the utilitarian calculus
best approximated by the legislative process. However, if one rejects the idea that limitless
governmental power best promotes the public good-as this political process argument
does-there is no reason to say that a decision is "principled" only if it is not concerned with
the general welfare. Compare id. at 516. See also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1970): "[Tlhe society also values the capacity of the judges to
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2 Stimulus to PoliticalActivity
Even if the vote-maximizing legislator in this model believes that
she would gain as many consumer votes by opposing the licensing of
barbers as she would lose in producer votes, she must consider an addi-
tional factor in reaching a decision: a legislator's voting behavior may
influence other forms of political activity such as campaign contribu-
tions and volunteer manpower efforts.6 3
A rational legislator would not disregard the importance of these
other types of political activity. Bribery and other illegal activity are
excluded from the model;64 therefore, it is assumed that the legislator
will not promise explicitly to mold her vote on a licensing bill in return
for campaign support. Nevertheless, political activity will affect legisla-
tive decisionmaking.
Despite the absence of any quidpro quo, a rational legislator will
be aware that her particular votes might inspire political activity for or
against her future candidacy. It is not illegal for a legislator to vote a
certain way on a bill in the hope that her vote will inspire favorable
political activity by constituents. Furthermore, even if the expectation
of such political support never determines a legislator's vote, political
activity still remains relevant to the model, since candidates whose
views are already sympathetic to the politically active constituencies
will have an advantage. If political activity cannot change the legisla-
tor's vote, it may succeed in replacing the legislator.
One must therefore ask whether a vote on an issue such as the
licensing of barbers will stimulate political activity, and if so, whether
that activity will have any systematic tendency to favor one side of the
issue. To the extent that political activity is costly to the participant,
the analysis in the previous section applies here as well. A self-inter-
ested consumer would be ill-advised to contribute to a campaign for
the sole purpose of defeating a piece of legislation worth $20 to her.65
draw its attention to issues of the largest principle that may have gone unheeded in the
welter of its pragmatic doing."
63. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 41, 46 and accompanying text.
65. Kenneth Goldin argues that large but diffuse groups, such as consumers, will have
difficulty in raising campaign funds. Such contributions should be viewed as "public
goods," because the contribution of each individual will secure benefits for many individuals
other than the contributor. According to economic theory, "public goods" generally will be
underproduced. See Goldin, Price Externalities Influence Public Policy, 23 PUBLIC CHOICE,
1, 5-6 (1975). See also M. OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 36 (1965) (The larger the group, the more it will fall short of
obtaining the optimal supply of any collective good.).
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The cost of group activity exacerbates this handicap.66 It would be
very costly to organize a group of millions of relatively indifferent con-
sumers to campaign against such legislation. In addition, once organ-
ized, each consumer would have an incentive to take a "free ride" on
the political activity of the group.67 In contrast, producer groups are
smaller and consist of members who are more easily identified.68 Thus,
although the victims of licensing collectively have a larger financial
stake in a licensing statute than the beneficiaries, 69 the democratic pro-
cess fails to respond to that fact because of the disproportionate costs of
group activity.
3. Information Available to Legislators
Thus far, it has been assumed that legislators know that the pro-
posed statute actually will harm consumers but, for rational vote maxi-
mizing reasons, have chosen to disregard that information. There is,
however, no reason to presume such legislative omniscience. Interested
parties often supply legislators with information; a producer group with
a multi-million dollar stake in an issue will have an incentive to hire
lobbyists and to canvas available research for independent confirma-
tion of its views.7°
Of course, there are consumers' lobbying groups that seek to per-
suade legislative bodies, and the presence of such consumer groups cer-
tainly helps to some extent. The problems of organizing large groups,7 1
however, significantly limit the amount of time and money consumer
groups can invest in lobbying against a particular monopoly law.
Thus, producer groups can use their inherent organizational advan-
tages to convey a message that, however bad monopoly may be in gen-
66. See Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1489 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Developments] (cost of group activity
discussed in the context of advocating judicial review of anti-competitive economic legisla-
tion under state constitutions).
67. See Goldin, supra note 65, at 5-6.
68. See Williams, Commentary, in LICENSURE, supra note 18, at 37 ("The practitioners
are a well-identified group; their free rider policing costs are relatively low; and these two
factors, in combination with others, make organization costs relatively low."); M. OLSON,
JR., supra note 65, at 133-41 (Business and professional groups, already organized for the
purpose of economic activities, face less expense in organizing the same individuals
politically.).
69. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70. Goldin, supra note 65, at 3-7, has observed that an imbalance between business and
consumer lobbying is the expected result of the free rider problem.
71. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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eral, the specific occupation being debated is different.72
A second and more controversial concern is that the groups which
call themselves consumers' organizations may not adequately represent
the diverse interests of consumers.7 3 It has been suggested that the in-
terests of the politically active consumers may differ in important re-
spects from those of the less active.74 If an organization lobbying for
consumers fails to fairly and adequately represent rank-and-file con-
sumers, it is difficult to remove the organization. By contrast, individ-
ual members of a producers' trade association have a larger incentive
to hold the trade association accountable. The political process thus
provides little assurance to consumers that their interests will be pro-
tected when monopoly legislation is under consideration.
C. Process Considerations in Judicial Review
In a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
the Supreme Court articulated a rationale for a "double standard" of
judicial review of legislation. Under this double standard, most classes
of legislation are to be accorded broad deference, while others are to be
subjected to strict scrutiny.76 The Court suggested that an active judici-
ary generally is unjustified because of the "political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion. 77 Moreover, "those political processes [are] ordinarily to be re-
lied upon to protect minorities. ' 78 The Court indicated, however, that
greater judicial scrutiny is warranted when a class of legislation threat-
ens the self-correcting political process or harms "discrete and insular
minorities."'79
72. Professor, now Judge, Winter has argued that the individual consumer faces greater
informational disadvantages in governmental affairs than in the marketplace. See R. WIN-
TER, JR., THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE VERSUS THE CONSUMER (American Enterprise Insti-
tute Special Analysis 2-39, 1972).
73. There is no single "consumer interest" because different consumers have different
tastes in the tradeoff between cost, quality, and other product characteristics. Those con-
sumers who prefer a tradeoff different from that which a consumer advocacy agency believes
is correct would be unrepresented in the political process. Id at 15.
74. Id. at 16. A real risk is that consumer organizations will represent the political
views of the consuming middle class, in which case their advocacy may work to the disad-
vantage of the poor. Id.
75. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
76. Professor Ely's constitutional theory draws heavily from this Carolene Products ra-
tionale. See J. ELY, supra note 6, at 75-77, where he discusses the footnote itself.




Carolene Products thus poses an empirical question about the reli-
ability of the political process to insure repeal of particular types of
statutes that prove to be undesirable."0 The model analyzed in the pre-
vious sections suggests that the political process sometimes can be quite
unreliable even where a statute does not directly restrict the operation
of the process itself.
The problem is most striking at the state level. Occupational li-
censing statutes can fail completely to carry out their stated purpose of
consumer protection and still remain on the books.8' Even if the licens-
ing statutes were in fact passed to protect the consumer, the concen-
trated-beneficiaries-and-diffuse-victims phenomenon8 2 tends to block
their repeal if they prove to be ineffective or counterproductive.
At the federal level, there has been meaningful progress in deregu-
lating several industries.83 But the problem certainly has not disap-
peared. Bernard Siegan has summarized the present situation as
follows:
Brandeis evidently believed [in his New State Ice dissent] that the
public process functions like a laboratory in which experiments
can be ended at will. The current effort to deregulate industry
demonstrates his error; it is not easy to stop a political experi-
ment. Regulation creates vested interests in both public and pri-
vate sectors which will strongly oppose efforts to eliminate it.
8 4
80. Professor Buchanan has developed a social contract theory that includes a "consti-
tutional" stage at which individuals determine the spheres over which various decisionmak-
ing authorities will have power. If individual government policies in a particular sphere
systematically tend to injure the public, one might question the "constitutional" authoriza-
tion for such policies. See J. BUCHANAN, supra note 45, at 18. Although Buchanan's con-
cern is the general process of making a constitution, rather than the federal Constitution's
present meaning, his theory and Carolene Products pose essentially similar questions. The
issue is which powers citizens would refuse to yield to the state because they thereafter could
not control how or for whom the state would use such powers. Buchanan concludes that
most restrictions on entry into professions, occupations, types of investment, and geographic
location would be rejected at the "constitutional" stage. Id. at 16.
81. One possible solution to the problem involves the use of state "sunset laws," under
which state regulations automatically terminate unless the legislature takes affirmative ac-
tion to save them. Donald Martin conducted a study to learn whether states could effec-
tively use sunset laws to repeal harmful occupational licensing restrictions. Martin found
that special interest lobbying pressures by the affected occupations preserved the over-
whelming majority of such laws. He concluded that the prospect for using sunset laws to
repeal occupational licensing restrictions was "not encouraging." Martin, Will the Sun Set
on Occupational LicensingZ in LICENSURE, supra note 18, at 148.
82. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980); Stag-
gers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980). The political process has
been, however, exceedingly slow at bringing about even these modest reforms.
84. B. SIEGAN, supra note 19, at 327.
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For example, the banking industry has used its political influence to
block new competition. 85 Similarly, political forces resist allowing the
private sector to compete fully against the Postal Service. 6 Ronald
Reagan's appointment of pro-regulation members to the Interstate
Commerce Commission87 is a striking example of political forces over-
powering ideological adherence to the principle of free trade.
One explanation for the somewhat different results reached at the
federal and state level may be that principled, ideological decisionmak-
ing has attained greater significance within the federal system.88 Still, it
would overstate the case to claim that the political process has rendered
legislative decisionmaking wholly oblivious to general principles even
at the state level. Judicial review can perform a valuable role by pro-
viding a framework or language that assists legislators who are striving
to keep the political process attuned to broader principles.89
The second standard articulated by the Supreme Court in the
Carolene Products test expresses a heightened concern for "discrete and
insular minorities." 90 Several commentators have noted that the class
of would-be producers excluded from a particular occupation is a polit-
ically invisible class of isolated individuals. 9' These individuals are so
submerged politically that they rarely reach one's consciousness as a
discrete group with interests in need of protection. The excluded class
is more than simply an interest group with a good cause that lost in the
legislative process. The political system does not merely reject their
claim; to a considerable extent it fails even to recognize it. The losers
are not an identifiable group that can form new alliances in the plural-
ist struggle because the high cost of political activity makes it irrational
85. See, e.g., Banking Bummer, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1982, at 30, col. 1.
86. See M. FRIEDMAN, AN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 14 (2d ed. 1975) (concentrated inter-
ests effectively oppose elimination of the postal monopoly).
87. See N.Y. Times, July 30, 1981, at A18, col. 1.
88. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L.
REv. 91 (1950). Paulsen argues that the case for judicial review of economic legislation at
the state level is stronger because of shorter legislative sessions and more concentrated inter-
est group pressure. Id. at 117-18. A case for stricter judicial review by state courts of anti-
competitive legislation is presented in Developments, supra note 66, at 1478.
89. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
90. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
91. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 50. ("ITihe scattered individuals who are denied access to
an occupation by State-enforced barriers are about as impotent a minority as can be
imagined."). See also Developments, supra note 66, at 1488 (consumers and potential en-
trants should be treated as "functional minorities"); B. SIEGAN, supra note 19, at 189 (would-
be producers are insular minorities; the Carolene Products footnote incorrectly assumes that
the infirmities of legislatures are confined to certain subject matter).
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to take such corrective action. Since this defect is present even in a
properly functioning democratic system, the Court can demonstrate so-
licitude for these individuals without insinuating ill motives or partial-
ity on the part of a coequal governmental branch.
It might be argued that in the model no discrete and insular mi-
nority exists because would-be barbers have the same concentrated
stake in repealing licensing laws that established barbers have in pre-
serving them. The flaw in this argument is that each licensed individ-
ual has a vested state privilege to protect; the licensees have a
guaranteed advantage in the marketplace secured by the enforced entry
barrier. By contrast, no individual outside the licensed occupation
secures a vested right by the repeal of the licensing law.92 Even if a
group of rational would-be barbers could somehow find each other 93
and form a coalition, no individual in the group could be sure that she
would derive any benefit at all from free competition. When one adds
legislative inertia and the vested interest of every existing member of
the occupation to the calculus, it is not surprising that the class of
would-be barbers is essentially a political non-entity.
III. Individual Rights and the Free Competition for Lawful
Occupations
The relative importance that process considerations and notions of
individual rights have in determining the content of unenumerated
constitutional liberties is a subject beyond the scope of this Article.9 4
Although process considerations may weaken the case for deferring to
the legislative judgment about the existence and nature of a given right,
courts still may need an affirmative reason to protect that right through
active judicial review.95 This section develops a thesis that the failure
to protect free competition by means of the Due Process Clause is in-
92. See Goldin, supra note 65, at 3. Goldin notes that political advocacy in favor of
competition will be underproduced because the benefits of open competition primarily will
be recouped by persons other than those lobbying.
93. For an excellent treatment of this point, see T. SOWELL, supra note 32, at 133. Eco-
nomic incumbents and nonincumbents face differences in the cost of knowledge:
"[l]ncumbents know who they are individually, what they have in common, and what they
have at stake." Id By contrast, those who might have become doctors or formed a different
type of transportation industry were it not for the AMA and ICC will never be able to
identify each other with anywhere near the same degree of certainty.
94. For a view that notions of individual rights should predominate, see Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
95. The purpose of the Carolene Products footnote is to determine circumstances in
which "there may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
... ." 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
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consistent with the treatment accorded similar values under other con-
stitutional provisions. Parts A through D examine decisions involving
these other constitutional provisions in order to identify recurring
themes that have implications for free competition. Part E explicitly
considers the criteria that govern the doctrine of substantive due
process.
A. Commercial Speech
The modern Court has held that commercial speech96 is entitled to
some First Amendment protection. Thus, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,97 the Court invali-
dated a statute that threatened pharmacists with license revocation if
they advertised the prices of prescription drugs.98 Similarly, in Bates v.
State Bar ofArizona,99 the Court held unconstitutional a rule that pro-
hibited lawyers from advertising."0°
Since it has been argued that commercial speech is outside the
scope of appropriate constitutional concernm ' 0 and does not differ in
any significant way from other commercial practices, 10 2 one must ask
whether these decisions actually promote any particular value. One
answer is that commercial speech helps to preserve an open, competi-
tive economy subject to restrictions on business practices which do not
threaten that openness. As Robert Bork has noted:
New products are advertised more intensively than old; there is
less customer loyalty in markets with intensive advertising than
in those with less; and the firm with the largest market share usu-
ally does not advertise so intensively as those seeking to gain
market share. This, together with the other evidence indicates
that advertising is a means of providing information. The provi-
sion of information about alternatives tends to break down estab-
lished market positions, and no amount of information provided
96. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically defined "commercial speech," the
Court has described it as speech that "propose[s] an economic transaction." Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762, 771 n.24 (1976).
97. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
98. Id. at 773.
99. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
100. Id. at 384.
101. See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing): "The Court insists that the rule it lays down is consistent even with the view that the
First Amendment is 'primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a de-
mocracy.' I had understood this view to relate to public decisionmaking as to political,
social, and other public issues, rather than the decision of a particular individual as to
whether to purchase one or another kind of shampoo."
102. See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
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by the firm with an established position can drown out the news
of an alternative.
10 3
Studies by Brozen, 1' 4 Ferguson,"0 5 Benham, 06 and Telser 10 7 add em-
pirical support to Bork's conclusion.
It is true that many economists believe that advertising can act as a
barrier to entry into a market under certain circumstances. 10 8  This
view does not, however, detract from the validity of decisions such as
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, since the complete prohibition of
highly factual information about a specific product is widely regarded
as anti-competitive.'0 9
Of course, one might argue that free competition is not a "First
Amendment value" since the transmission of information is only one of
many means available to promote such competition. Nevertheless, the
advertising cases suggest the Court's proper recognition that free com-
petition is a constitutional value which often is furthered by freedom of
speech. An analogy may be drawn to the value of self-definition, which
the Court appears to protect in certain First Amendment cases'10 and
substantive due process decisions."'
The Court's commercial speech holdings protect an open economy
from a political process which persistently threatens to close that econ-
omy incrementally. A significant interest of established pharmacists
and attorneys in suppressing information about drug prices and legal
service availability is preventing consumer disloyalty and price wars.
Although consumers benefit from the same information, 1 2 their inter-
103. R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 316 (1978).
104. Brozen, The FTCAttack on Advertising, 5 RELIGION & SOC'Y 12, 22 (1972) (Adver-
tising makes markets more competitive.).
105. Ferguson, Advertising and Liquor, 40 J. Bus. 414 (1967) (Advertising is a means of
entry rather than a barrier to entry in the liquor industry.).
106. Benham, The Effect of Advertiing on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. L. & ECON. 337
(1972) (Advertising reduces price of eyeglasses.).
107. Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537, 556 (1964) (Review of
studies shows advertising is a means of entry into a market.).
108. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 390-93 (2d ed. 1980).
109. See, e.g., id at 376-77.
110. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
S11. Although other factors undoubtedly influenced the Court in its substantive due pro-
cess decisions, all of the cases involved an individual attempting to determine for herself
some important aspect of her own identity. It is likely that most people define themselves in
large part by their status as a parent, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and by the family members with whom they choose to
live, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
112. Lawyer advertising has made possible the emergence of legal clinics that can pro-
vide services for 30-35% less than the price charged by the established firms. See B. SIEGAN
supra note 19, at 231.
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ests are more diffuse and therefore undervalued by the political
process.'
1 3
If it is true that competition manifested in the form of speech is
essentially no different from economic competition generally, the in-
consistent treatment given free competition and speech can be reme-
died by the recognition of economic competition as a constitutional
value. 1 4 Consistent treatment would not require a return to Lochner-
type scrutiny of business practice regulation. In the commercial speech
area, the Court has upheld regulation of certain advertising practices,
including the misleading use of trade names" 5 and the solicitation of
clients under conditions of duress. 1 6 In addition, a majority of the
Court has indicated a willingness to accept as constitutional an across-
the-board prohibition of commercial advertising on billboards." 7
The commercial speech cases are especially refreshing in their
treatment of paternalistic arguments offered to defend laws that restrict
free competition. The Court has stated:
It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who wishes to
provide low cost, and assertedly low quality, services is permitted
to advertise, he will be taken up on his offer by too many unwit-
ting customers. They will choose the low-cost, low-quality serv-
ice and drive the "professional" pharmacist out of business ...
They will go from one pharmacist to another, following the dis-
count, and destroy the pharmacist-customer relationship. They
will lose respect for the profession because it advertises. All this
is not in their best interests, and all this can be avoided if they are
not permitted to know who is charging what.
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is
not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best in-
terests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them. If they are truly open, nothing pre-
vents the "professional" pharmacist from marketing his own as-
sertedly superior product, and contrasting it with that of the low-
113. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
114. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 19, at 321-22.
115. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
116. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
117. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court struck
down an ordinance prohibiting, with certain limited exceptions, billboards containing either
commercial or noncommercial messages. The Court held that the statute extended too far
into areas of protected speech. Id. at 521. Five Justices, however, indicated a willingness to
accept a complete ban of commercial advertising on billboards. See id. at 540-42 (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part).
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cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer. 118
The Court's treatment of paternalistic arguments in this passage would
apply to similar arguments in support of monopoly legislation.
It is not suggested that paternalistic concerns can never constitute
legitimate state interests, but merely that the Court looks unfavorably
upon such arguments when the means employed by the state abridge
constitutional values. As noted earlier," 19 the state can promote its pa-
ternalistic interests by banning the product or directly regulating the
offensive business practice.'
20
B. "Dormant" Commerce Clause
Despite its general deference to legislative judgments on economic
issues, the modern Court has continued to invalidate state laws that
burden interstate commerce under the "dormant" Commerce
Clause.' 2 1 Particularly vulnerable have been statutes that appear to
shield local businesses from out-of-state competition. In Baldwin v.
G.A.F Seelig, Inc.,'22 the Court struck down a New York statute that
prohibited the retail sale of milk purchased outside the state at prices
lower than the minimum purchase price permitted in New York. In
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,23 the Court invalidated a Madison,
Wisconsin ordinance that prohibited sales of pasteurized milk which
had not been pasteurized at a plant within five miles of Madison. More
recently, in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission,124 the
Court struck down a North Carolina statute that prevented Washing-
ton apple growers from displaying their state grading label, a designa-
tion that consumers believed was evidence of a superior brand of apple.
118. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-70.
119. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.-
120. This view is consistent with the Court's commercial speech decisions in which
speech connected with an illegal service is not protected. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (sex-designated help wanted col-
umns not protected under the First Amendment).
121. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 256: "The commerce barrier to state action
arises in two, frequently overlapping, situations. In the first, Congress has been wholly si-
lent: it has taken no action, express or implied, indicating its own policy on a given subject
matter. In that situation, the objection to state authority rests entirely on the 'dormant'
commerce clause of Art. I, § 8-on the unexercised commerce power itself, and on the free
trade value it symbolizes. In the second situation, Congress has exercised the commerce
power, has indicated its policy, and the challenge to state action rests on valid, 'supreme'
national legislation which compels inconsistent state action to give way-by virtue not only
of the exercise of the commerce power under Art. I, § 8, but also because of the effect of the
Supremacy Clause in Art. VI." (emphasis in original).
122. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
123. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
124. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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One may question whether such restrictions on the autonomy of
the states are justified. 25 Commentators generally respond that states
have an incentive to place the interest of their own citizens above the
nation's interest by passing parochial legislation. 26 This explanation,
however, seems to contradict established economic theory by assuming
that protectionist laws benefit the citizenry of the legislating states
while harming the rest of the country. 27
With limited exceptions, free trade is generally beneficial to the
collective citizenry of each state. For example, if Washington has a
comparative advantage 28 in apple production and North Carolina has
a similar advantage in, perhaps, textiles production, North Carolina
harms both itself and Washington by passing a law that requires it to
devote its resources to the production of its relatively inefficient apple
industry.
29
The traditional explanation for dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence has never been harmonized with accepted economic theory;
as a result, that explanation provides a rather weak defense of judicial
intervention. Apparently dormant Commerce Clause review, like the
common law, owes its continued utility more to experience than to
125. The textual foundation in the Constitution for judicial review of state legislation
impeding interstate commerce is relatively weak. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides: "The
Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce ... among the several states. .. ."
By its terms, this clause does not discuss the power of the states. Although it is true that one
of the Framers' purposes was to do something about protectionist legislation, the text sug-
gests that the remedy they chose was to grant power to Congress rather than the courts.
126. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 319. Tribe discusses Commerce Clause cases as
an example of "the Judicial Role in Confining Economic Localism." Some Commerce
Clause cases can be characterized in this manner. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) (effort of a state to shift an environmental problem to another state). This
characterization is highly questionable, however, when given to cases involving economi-
cally protectionist statutes.
127. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 626-81 (1 1th ed. 1980).
128. It is impossible by definition for one state to have a "comparative advantage" in the
production of all products. One state might be absolutely superior at producing both textiles
and apples, but even such absolute superiority would not eliminate the mutual benefits from
free trade. See id. at 627.
129. The state might seek to impoverish its neighboring state by imposing import restric-
tions for the ultimate purpose of altering the terms of trade. Most economists, however,
believe that few restrictions are optimal even from the point of view of the protectionist
state's own interest. In particular, the "terms of trade" assertion is a weak argument for
protectionism by a state too small to affect the market price significantly. Id. at 657.
One cannot dismiss all arguments for protectionism lightly. It is theoretically possible
that a state could benefit its own citizenry by enacting certain exclusionary laws. Possible
valid arguments include the need to protect infant industries and the need to compensate for
fixed exchange rates. Id. at 658-59. Of course, between states, the exchange rates are fixed;
however, the states do not conduct their own monetary policies, so there should not be the
same need for currency adjustments that is present in international trade.
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logic. '3 States do have a tendency to pass protectionist laws that harm
the national welfare. But state parochialism does not explain that ten-
dency; instead, it appears that states pass such laws because of the pro-
cedural defect in the political process caused by the phenomenon of
concentrated-versus-diffuse-interests. 13
The analysis of the political process set forth in Section II of this
article directly applies to a case such as Washington Apple Advertising
Commission. While North Carolina apple producers would be in-
formed about proposed legislation relating to apple imports, North
Carolina apple consumers probably would not. Producers would be
much more likely than consumers to change their voting and other
political participation decisions based on that single issue. Producers
also would lobby the legislature with information about the bill; con-
sumer groups might not.
32
If the problem in dormant Commerce Clause cases is not state pa-
rochialism, the argument for treating interstate protectionist legislation
differently from other monopoly legislation becomes weaker. The
comparison is not perfect; for example, the Supreme Court has held
that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to validate anti-competi-
tive state legislation. 133 In the usual case, concentrated interests of out-
of-state producers will at least be heard in Congress; however, a licens-
ing statute with a grandfather clause may encounter no meaningful
opposition.
34
Although dormant Commerce Clause cases and state monopoly
legislation do not involve identical considerations, Commerce Clause
jurisprudence does provide some familiarity with the state interests of-
fered to justify monopoly laws.' 35 If the purpose of a statute is to pre-
vent those not already established in the occupation from pursuing that
130. See 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
131. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. Similarly, Professor Samuelson has
argued that the concentrated-versus-diffuse-interests phenomenon, rather than a desire of
each nation to benefit its own citizenry, explains international protectionism. See P. SAMU-
ELSON, supra note 127, at 654.
132. The facts of the case are revealing. The Washington Apple Advertising Commis-
sion requested a North Carolina official to grant Washington an exemption from the North
Carolina statutory scheme. The official responded that he first wanted "to have the senti-
ment from our apple producers since they were mainly responsible for this legislation being
passed." 432 U.S. at 352.
133. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
134. See supra note 56.
135. For a discussion of the issue of countervailing state interests, see supra notes 31-39 &
infra 214-25 and accompanying text.
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occupation, the purpose is invalid.'36 Even if the avowed purpose is
not the suppression of competition, the Court will balance the "practi-
cal effect" that the law has on competition against the interests asserted
by the state.'37 The Court also will consider the presence of less restric-
tive alternatives that would adequately preserve the state's interest.
38
In particular, the state can protect consumers by expanding its regula-
tory apparatus to cover all producers. 39
C. Noncommercial Speech
The traditional division of analysis between "economic" and
"noneconomic" constitutional claims, while useful for some purposes,
obscures important parallels between the concepts of freedom of speech
and free competition for lawful occupations. This section argues that
an anti-monopoly stance in substantive due process analysis would fur-
ther three First Amendment values: the right of self-expression, the
social benefits from the openness of the marketplace, and the checking
of governmental abuse.
1. Self-Expression
One value that freedom of speech promotes is the ability to express
one's individual personality. 4 ° Since self-expression can take numer-
ous forms, one might ask what is sufficiently unusual about speech to
justify special judicial solicitude. One answer, of course, is that the
136. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (statute unconsti-
tutional where avowed purpose and necessary tendency of statute was the suppression of
competition from out-of-state milk producers).
137. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (statute's
avowed purpose was the protection of health by facilitating local inspections; practical effect
of the law was suppression of competition).
138. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977)
(placing U.S.D.A. grade information on packages of apples would serve state interest in
avoiding consumer confusion without suppressing competition of Washington apples).
139. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354-56 (1951). (inspections of out-of-state milk
plants at plant expense or a uniform quality standard for acceptable milk as less restrictive
alternatives).
It should be noted that the state courts that review economic legislation under the due
process clauses of their state constitutions already employ similar tests. A review of cases
from states that maintain meaningful economic scrutiny concluded: "One limitation on le-
gitimate legislative goals is that the restraint of competition in the marketplace is considered
inimical to the general welfare; consequently, statutes designed to impair competition will be
upheld only if they also promote some other goal recognized to be within the police power.
Indeed, in some states the promotion of additional goals may not be sufficient to save an
anticompetitive statute." Developments, supra note 66, at 1469.
140. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men
free to develop their faculties.").
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Framers gave more explicit protection to speech in the constitutional
text. 4 ' This contention is certainly weighty; however, at least at the
federal level, it does not seem conclusive because the Framers also pro-
vided that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."'
' 42
The Court has interpreted the Constitution to safeguard unenumerated
rights 143 such as privacy,'" association, 145 family cohabitation, 46 and
travel. 147 Another drawback to this argument for the unique constitu-
tional treatment of speech is that the Framers probably intended the
text of the First Amendment to prevent only prior restraints 148 and to
constrain only the federal government, allowing widespread punish-
ment for speech.1
49
A second defense for the special character of speech could be that
speakers are disadvantaged in the political process, while claimants to
various economic liberties are not. 50 A thesis of this Article, however,
is that for at least one economic liberty-the free competition for soci-
ety's lawful occupations-the political process systematically fails to
provide adequate protection. The second response, therefore, is
equally unpersuasive, at least as a justification for refusing to extend
judicial review to monopoly legislation.
It has been suggested that the real distinction between speech and
most other activities is that the freedom to mold and convey ideas is an
integral part of one's self-definition or self-concept in a way that few
141. See C. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 217-21 (1960) (textual foundation
of speech justifies different standard of judicial review for economic freedom and free
speech). The limited judicial review of economic legislation advocated in this Article would
be insufficient to jeopardize the preferred. position of speech.
142. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
143. A full treatment of noninterpretive rights is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
view that the Court should identify and protect widely shared ideals, see Perry, TheAbortion
Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court'r Role in American Government, 66 GEO.
L.J. 1191, 1216-19 (1978).
144. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
146. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
147. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
148. See B. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VERSUS PUBLIC ACCESS 125 (1976).
149. Judge Robert Bork has indicated that the self-actualization value does not distin-
guish speech from other activities and therefore should play no role in First Amendment
jurisprudence. See Bork, Neutral Princiles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 25 (1971). Judge Bork's argument poses a challenge to those who wish to retain a
principled judiciary; however, one can avoid Judge Bork's drastic solution by recognizing
core concepts of self-actualization in spheres beyond speech.
150. See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424, 1440-49 (1962),
(setting forth a process rationale for a judicial double standard).
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other activities are.' 5 ' Although the idea of self-definition may distin-
guish speech from many activities, it tends to emphasize the similarity
between the arguments for occupational freedom and for freedom of
speech.' 52 Statutes that fix prices or divide outputs may not directly
implicate this value, but a law that completely excludes a person from
entering a lawful occupation almost certainly would affect that person's
self-concept. 53 Any claim that more individuals define themselves by
their ideas than by their occupations must be considered speculative.
154
If the protection of core concepts of self-actualization is a proper con-
stitutional concern, the case for active judicial review of statutes that
exclude persons from pursuing lawful occupations becomes stronger.
2. Marketplace of Ideas
Freedom of speech promotes a second value that is described by
the metaphor of an open "marketplace of ideas."' 55 According to this
theory, undesirable consequences generally will result if the govern-
ment attempts to preclude Idea A from competing with Idea B. There
is, however, no satisfactory reason to believe that free competition pro-
duces social benefits in the "marketplace of ideas" but not in the mar-
ketplace of goods and services.
156
151. See Baker, Scope ofthe First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rav. 964,
990-1009 (1978).
152. See McCloskey, supra note 91, at 46: "Judges and professors are talkers both by
profession and avocation. It is not surprising that they would view freedom of expression as
primary to the free play of their personalities. But most men would probably feel that an
economic right, such as freedom of occupation, was at least as vital to them as the right to
speak their minds." As noted earlier, however, the self-actualization value alone might jus-
tify only a rather narrow definition of "occupation." See supra note 4.
153. In Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102, n.23 (1976), Justice Stevens
quoted with approval the following statement made by Justice Hughes in Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915): "'[T]he right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."'
154. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 19, at 4 ("For a great many in our society, the opportu-
nity to engage freely in a business, trade, occupation, or profession is the most important
liberty society has to offer.").
155. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But when
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,--that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that the truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.").
156. See Coase, The Marketfor Goods and the Marketfor Ideas, 64 AM. EcON. REv. 354,
384 (1974) (consumer ignorance is as great in the idea market); Director, The Parity of the
Economic Market Place, 7 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1964).
Frederick von Hayek has offered a persuasive argument for the differences in our atti-
tudes about essentially similar marketplaces. He notes that advances in the intellectual
Confidence in any open marketplace reflects distrust of the meth-
ods of authoritarian selection and a preference for giving a citizen the
option to reject proposed transactions.' 57 A divergence between the
interests of the rulers and the ruled sometimes may justify such distrust.
Often, however, the problem is that the most dedicated and sincere cen-
sors do not possess enough knowledge to determine in advance which
messages each individual would be better off not hearing.'58 The meta-
phor of the marketplace expresses a preference for an experimental
process that strives to tap knowledge not available to the government.
Commentators have criticized the "marketplace of ideas" concept
for its failure to consider monopolistic imperfections in the idea mar-
ket' 59 and for its insistence that market processes will insure the ulti-
mate victory of truth.' 60 Whatever the merits of these criticisms, they
do not justify laws that create monopolies in ideas or other services.
Market power imperfections may support the need to apply antitrust
laws to newspapers 1 1 or labor laws to baking establishments. 62 Such
defects, however, provide little support for laws restricting the speech
rights of would-be Communists 163 or the occupational rights of would-
be barbers.' 6
sphere are the product of an interactive process that no planner, no matter how intent upon
furthering the "better" ideas, could have foreseen or designed. By contrast, the separation
between scholars and the decisionmaking process of economic production keeps those schol-
ars from appreciating the fact that economic decisions are also the product of multiple ex-
periments and adaptions that could not have been foreseen in their entirety by any planner.
See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 33 (1960).
157. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
158. Justice Holmes argued that persecution for the expression of an opinion would be
perfectly logical if legislators had enough knowledge to warrant the criminal penalty.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Hayek has as-
serted that the same rationale makes free trade important in other services. See F. HAYEK,
supra note 156, at 31 ("Freedom granted only when it is known beforehand that its effects
will be beneficial is not freedom. If we knew how freedom would be used, the case for it
would largely disappear.").
159. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521, 550.
160. See, e.g., DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Questfor Truth. Toward a
TeleologicalApproach to First Amendment Adudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 188-94
(1972).
161. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
162. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
163. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conviction upheld).
164. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). The government in Lieb-
mann argued that the ice industry was monopolistically organized. The Court properly re-
sponded, "[tihe practical tendency of the restriction. . . is to shut out new enterprises, and
thus create and foster monopoly in the hands of existing establishments, against, rather than
in aid of, the interest of the consuming public." Id. at 278.
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The contention that freedom of speech is unable to guarantee truth
similarly does not justify monopoly legislation. The competitive pro-
cess does enrich the lives of individuals by permitting a variety of com-
munications from which those individuals can fulfill their perceived
needs.'65 That function is important whether such needs include the
discovery of ultimate truths or merely comic relief from daily life.' 66 If
anything, a decoupling of the "marketplace of ideas" from the search
for truth would tend to highlight the inconsistency of failing to protect
competitive conditions in marketplaces that fulfill other perceived
human needs.
67
In any event, the case for an open marketplace in ideas or products
depends primarily on the superiority of the allocation process rather
than on the importance of the items being allocated. 68 It is not neces-
sary to decide whether cheaper haircuts are more important than new
comic books, or whether suppression of new strains of wheat is a more
serious evil than suppression of the Pentagon Papers. Instead, the
value of an open marketplace is in its ability to discover and fulfill the
broad spectrum of human needs.
Licensing laws prevent an individual from pursuing an occupation
for the purported reason that, if the individual were granted a license,
she would engage in business practices detrimental to the consumer.
Licensing statutes do not impose subsequent punishment for harmful
commercial practices; rather, licenses are denied in advance because
the state fears that certain traits of the producer indicate the potential
for such harmful practices. For that reason, it is useful to examine
First Amendment law that discourages prior restraints on speech.'69
A court might uphold a statute imposing punishment for obscen-
165. See Blasi, supra note 159.
166. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (The book "Fanny Hill" is
protected speech.).
167. See Engman, The Failure of Regulation (1974), reprinted in ECONOMIC IssuEs 241
(5th ed. 1975): "Though most government regulation was enacted under the guise of pro-
tecting the consumer from abuse, much of today's regulatory machinery does little more
than shelter producers from the normal competitive consequences of lassitude and and inef-
ficiency. In some cases, the world has changed reducing the original threat of abuse. In
other cases, the regulatory machinery has simply become perverted. In still other cases, the
machinery was a mistake from the start. In any case, the consumer, for whatever presumed
abuse he is being spared, is paying plenty in the form of government-sanctioned price
fixing."
168. See M. ROTHBARD, supra note 59, at 81-85 (arguing that the distortion produced by
the governmental allocation process is a common thread connecting problems in otherwise
diverse goods and services).
169. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
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ity170 or the advocacy of violent governmental overthrow, 171 since those
actions entail risks that the government has the constitutional power to
prevent. The court, however, would never validate a statute which pro-
vided that anyone wishing to write about sex or speak at a protest rally
must first obtain a license by successfully completing a two-week
course on techniques of appropriate public discourse.1
72
Professor Blasi has discussed the justification for the presumptions
against prior restraints on speech. 173 According to Blasi, society is un-
likely to achieve a "balanced assessment of competing values" in the
sterile, caution inducing environment of a prior restraint determina-
tion.174 The criteria for selecting licensing officials tend to be their
knowledge of and concern for the social interest promoted by suppres-
sion rather than the social interest promoted by "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open"'175 communication.176 The data from initial dissemina-
tion of the speech might dispel exaggerated fears upon which the effort
to restrain the speech was based. 177 If Professor Blasi's analysis of
human behavior operating within institutions of prior restraint is accu-
rate, one must entertain doubts about the logic of prior suppression
determinations in contexts other than the "marketplace of ideas."
3. Checking Governmental Abuse
Commentators have defended free speech as an instrument of
countervailing power that helps individuals guard their liberty against
170. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
171. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (Speech is unprotected if it
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.).
172. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Minnesota law allowing a judge to bar
publication of any newspaper found "malicious, scandalous, or defamatory" an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint).
173. See, e.g. Blasi, supra note 38.
174. Id. at 52-53.
175. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
176. See Blasi, supra note 38, at 59.
177. Id at 49. This is even more likely to be the case in the area of occupational free-
dom. If the fears that might have generated economic regulation prove groundless, the pub-
lic will protest any effort to take away desirable services to which they now have become
accustomed. In contrast, a radical speaker still may be feared by the public after his speech
fails to produce any noticeable adverse effect.
The idea of undifferentiated fear has played an important role in prior restraint juris-
prudence. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 725-26 (Brennan, J.,
concurring): "The entire thrust of the Government's claim throughout these cases has been
that publication of the material sought to be enjoined "could" or "might" or "may"
prejudice the national interest in various ways. But the First Amendment tolerates abso-
lutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that
untoward consequences may result."
123Fall 19831
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
governmental oppression.178 Judicial review plays a role in preserving
what Eugene Rostow has called "an open society of widely dispersed
powers."'179  Constitutional protection of competitive economic
processes similarly would promote that value.
The absence of federal judicial review of state monopoly legisla-
tion has several undesirable effects upon political liberty. The most
obvious effect is that licensing decisions place the welfare of a specific
individual under the direct control of state officials, a process that cre-
ates risks of arbitrary decisions or of favoritism. 80 A more subtle effect
is that an economy permeated with barriers to entry into a variety of
occupations will be inhospitable to economic "newcomers" who have
not obtained a protected niche. In this country, excluded newcomers
tend to be members of racial and ethnic minorities.' 8' Those individu-
als may find themselves in the politically precarious position of having
to depend upon the continued benevolence of the state for their
subsistence.
82
178. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 159. Blasi contrasts his "checking value" with Alexander
Meiklejohn's "self government value." See id. at 554, 558-59 (discussing A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960)). The analogy between free competition and free speech is
stronger if one views the political value of free speech in Blasi's terms, since it envisions
government as a potential oppressor rather than as an agent.
179. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193, 199
(1952). The idea of "openness" recurs in constitutional discussions. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969) (public school's prohi-
bition on the wearing of black armbands was invalid: "it is this sort of hazardous freedom-
this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength ... ).
180. Licensing is often associated with governmental corruption when the value of the
license exceeds the fee for obtaining it. See Barron, supra note 32, at 645-48. It is also a tool
that an oppressive government could use. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(racially discriminatory laundry licensing system unconstitutional).
181. Restrictive occupational licensure laws harm minorities in two ways. First, such
laws reduce an employer's cost of discrimination. Under competitive conditions, an em-
ployer who refuses to hire a certain group of people because of her unsupported prejudices
will suffer competitively by losing qualified applicants. Licensing laws, by contrast, generate
a surplus of qualified candidates seeking to enter the artificially lucrative occupation; as a
result, discrimination can take place without sacrificing qualifications to the same degree.
Second, the state can administer the laws in a discriminatory manner, as it did against blacks
in the South and against Jews throughout the country in the 1930's. See T. SOWELL, supra
note 11, at 110.
182. The ability to sustain one's existence independently from the state may be the most
important source of political freedom. As Leon Trotsky noted, "In a country where the sole
employer is the state, opposition means death by slow starvation. The old principle, who
does not work shall not eat, has been replaced by a new one: who does not obey shall not
eat." L. Trotsky, quoted in F. HAYEK, supra note 156, at 137. The Framers were not una-'
ware of this relationship. As Alexander Hamilton stated, "[A] power over a man's subsis-




In contrast, free competition protects individuals persecuted politi-
cally by providing them with relatively safe harbors within which they
can fulfill their economic needs. Joseph McCarthy's victims found that
highly competitive industries supplied the most reliable refuge. 8 3 The
Jews have faced greater obstacles in heavily cartelized or monopolized
industries, since the cost of discriminating against them is lower in such
environments.' 84 Indeed, historically, the diverse economic opportuni-
ties made available by the competitive marketplace have been neces-
sary, although not sufficient, preconditions for the preservation of civil
liberties.8 5 Thus, it appears that free competition for lawful occupa-
tions is both a political and an economic right.
D. The Vested Rights Provisions: Government Taking and Contract
Impairment
Recent cases under the Taking and Contracts Clauses of the Con-
stitution'8 6 suggest a potentially important development in the jurispru-
dence of economic constitutional claims. The limited evidence
available indicates that the Supreme Court is becoming more sensitive
to the narrowness of the benefits conferred and burdens imposed by
state statutes when it assesses the validity of state laws under those two
clauses.
Focusing on the narrowness of a statute's financial consequences
could have ramifications not only for the economy but also for civil
liberties. Freedom is less secure if the government can punish the polit-
ically disloyal or reward the politically loyal with specially tailored
modifications of their property or contract rights. In order to avoid
selective punishment or secure selective rewards, a prudent owner of
property and her contracting partners might refrain from criticizing
state officials or provide active support to those officials. 8 7 This section
examines Taking and Contract Clause decisions to determine whether
the "narrowness" factor has implications in the context of due process
scrutiny of monopoly legislation.
In Agins v. Tiburon, 8' the Supreme Court considered a Taking
183. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 16-21.
184. See Alchian & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain in
ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS (1962).
185. See F. HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM 103 (1944); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 16-
21.
186. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. I provides: "No State shall ... pass any. . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S. CON sT. amend. V provides: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
187. See F. HAYEK, supra note 25, at 137.
188. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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Clause challenge to two "open space" municipal zoning ordinances.
The majority framed the issue as the constitutionality of "the applica-
tion of a generalzoning law to particular property .... ,,'89 The Court
then examined the narrowness of the benefits conferred and the bur-
dens imposed by the ordinances:
The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public
by securing the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly de-
velopment of residential property with provision for open space
areas. There is no indication that appellants' 5-acre tract is the
only property affected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore
will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's
exercise of its police power.' 90
Thus, the court upheld the zoning ordinances as valid exercises of the
city's police power. 191
The Court has commented upon the importance of the "narrow-
ness" factor in a modem Contracts Clause case as well. In Allied Struc-
tual Steel v. Spannaus,192 the Court struck down a Minnesota act
regulating pension funds on the ground that the act violated the Con-
tracts Clause. The majority noted that "whether or not the legislation
was aimed largely at a single employer, it clearly has an extremely nar-
row focus."' 9 3 The Court found that the statute could "hardly be char-
acterized. . . as one enacted to protect a broad societal interest rather
than a narrow class."'
194
One might argue that the auctioning of special governmental ben-
efits and burdens to small groups is a practice so thoroughly entrenched
in modem pluralism that the Court cannot or should not declare it un-
constitutional.'95 This Article, however, makes a narrower claim. Leg-
islation need not be invalidated merely because it distributes benefits
and burdens extremely narrowly. When legislation threatens other im-
portant values, on the other hand, and the issue is whether the judiciary
should defer to the legislative accommodation of those values, the
Court should feel more obliged to accept the legislative determination
when the statute is general in its application. The dynamics of special
interest lobbying can pressure a legislature into incrementally weaken-
ing values that the legislators themselves consider important. 96 A stat-
189. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 262.
191. Id. at 261-62.
192. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
193. Id. at 248.
194. Id. at 249.
195. See generally H. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936).
196. See 3 F. HAYEK, supra note 25, at 3.
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ute with a broad focus thus supplies some assurance that the state has
acted to limit important values only because it has decided that some
competing value is more compelling. The Court would do well to em-
ploy these principles in its analysis of statutes that assert comparative
distrust in the citizenry as a justification for conferring monopoly privi-
leges upon specific groups.
E. Free Competition and the Due Process Clause
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,I97 the Court invalidated a zon-
ing ordinance that prohibited the cohabitation of persons in certain ex-
tended family relationships. Justice Powell's plurality opinion stated:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for
this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives en-
hanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the gui-
dance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the
history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for con-
cern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the
predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of
this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint. But it
does not counsel abandonment. . . . Appropriate limits on sub-
stantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but
rather from "careful respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."' 9
Although a comprehensive judicial role in "bread and butter" is-
sues may be ill-advised, the exclusion of all "economic" claims from
the scope of heightened judicial review comes very close to Justice
Powell's "arbitrary line," unsupported by principled distinctions. Free
competition for society's lawful occupations is a value strongly imbed-
ded in this country's political 99 and legal traditions."c°
197. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
198. Id at 502-03 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis in original).
199. See W. GELLHORN, supra note 36, at 106 ("Until the end of the nineteenth century,
few occupations other than those of the lawyer and the physician were subject to state licens-
ing."). This tradition extends back to ancient Greece, where the manumission decrees
granted four rights to each freed slave: legal status as a protected member of the commu-
nity, immunity from arbitrary arrest, the right to work at whatever the person desired to do,
and the right to movement according to his own choice. See Westerman, Between Slavery
and Freedom, 50 AM. HIST. REv. 213, 213-27 (1945).
200. This value has been part of our legal tradition at least since an English court in Case
of Monopolies held that the grant of exclusive rights to produce any article was "against the
common law, and the benefit and liberty of the subject." Darug v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep.
1260, 1262-63 (K.B. 1603); see also E. COKE, INSTITUTFS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46-47,
63 (1817). English judges consistently defended the anti-monopoly principle; for a history,
see Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
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Apart from these traditions, this Article has argued that free com-
petition for lawful occupations implicates certain other basic values
that underlie American society. It furthers the fundamental value of
self-definition. 01 It also validates the presumption against the utility of
a closed marketplace-a presumption reflected in modem cases involv-
ing the dormant Commerce Clause °2 and freedom of speech, both
commercial20 3 and noncommercial."° Finally, constitutional protec-
tion of free competition would further the value of majority rule. 5
Heightened judicial review in the economic sphere would provide some
assurance that economic regulation is the product of the majority's con-
sidered opinion, rather than a mere collection of narrowly tailored
privileges secured irrespective of majority opinion.
20 6
Careful respect for the teachings of the Lochner history must re-
place a form of Lochner paranoia.20 7 The Lochner Court intervened in
economic disputes without articulating any reason to believe that the
legislative process systematically would produce results contrary to the
popular will; in essence, the Court lacked a theory of the political pro-
cess. Furthermore, the Lochner Court invalidated a very wide range of
economic legislation. As a result, the interests the Court protected
often did not implicate traditional and fundamental values tran-
scending partisan and ideological lines.20 8 Finally, because it struck
201. See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text. Although restrictions on business
monopolies and price-fixing may not directly implicate the self-definition value, they do
serve the political function of preserving countervailing power and thus indirectly work to
protect personal liberty. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 140-85 and accompanying text.
205. That "majority rule" is an important value underlying American society is more
often assumed than expressly argued. Of course, constitutional scholars have sought to jus-
tify judicial review against the contention that it is antimajoritorian and therefore undemo-
cratic. See, e.g., Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory
and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 830-32 (1974); Rostow, supra note 179, at 199-209.
These efforts evidence the widespread acceptance of the importance of majority rule, since
deviations from majoritarian processes are assumed to require special justification. In the
case of monopolistic statutes, it is the legislative process that produces antimajoritarian re-
sults; therefore, it should be judicial deference that requires justification.
206. See generally supra notes 40-93 & 194-95 and accompanying text.
207. See Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 43 (1972) ("[P]reoccupation with
the ghost of the old due process produced a judicial overreaction and continues to cast a
shadow on due process scrutiny of means as well as ends.").
208. Opposition to governmentally enforced monopoly cuts across the traditional ideo-
logical spectrum. See generally NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT, THE MONOPOLY MAKERS
(M. Green ed. 1973); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43. For example, the political left and right
cosponsored the effort to deregulate transportation. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 19, at 285-87.
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down so much economic legislation, the Court left legislatures few al-
ternative means of advancing widely shared purposes of social
reform.209
By contrast, a judicial barrier to the use of monopolistic means still
permits the legislature to make the final decision about legitimate state
purposes other than a purpose to create a monopoly for its own sake.210
Judicial review also leaves the state a substantial arsenal to accomplish
legitimate governmental purposes. As J. F. Barron has observed:
[W]hat is often ignored or forgotten when the question of licens-
ing arises is that we now have general law, not administered by
sellers, dealing with safety, sanitation, weights and measures, pu-
rity of foods and their preparation, labeling, truth in advertising,
use and sale of insecticides, use and storage of flammable materi-
als, zoning, building codes, and so on. In addition, there are laws
against fraud, violence, breach of contract, and other injurious
conduct, together with procedures for redress of wrongs inflicted
in the marketplace.211
IV. Countervailing State Interests
If the Court does recognize free competition for society's lawful
occupations as a constitutionally protected value, it must then deter-
mine which state interests should be sufficient to override that value.
209. Cq Gunther, supra note 207, at 42-46. Gunther argues that the problem with the
Lochner approach was that the Court limited permissible state ends. Relying on the Equal
Protection Clause, he advocates stricter scrutiny of the relationship between the means used
and the purpose proferred by the state for a given statute. Gunther's test has two shortcom-
ings. First, it suggests that the Court should apply a uniform level of scrutiny for all eco-
nomic legislation. For example, the Court should not be able to decide as a matter of
constitutional law whether an EPA standard really protects the environment or an OSHA
standard really protects the worker. If permitted to do so, the Court would be likely to apply
a weak standard of scrutiny. Thereafter, when called upon to scrutinize legislation involving
areas where the political process is deficient-for instance, the area of monopoly legisla-
tion-the Court might fail to act decisively because it would be required to utilize the same
weak standard of scrutiny.
A second deficiency with Gunther's test is that a legislature striving to pass a monopoly
could simply state that the protection of producers was one of the statute's purposes. Under
those circumstances, the Court would have to defer to the legislature because the means used
and the purposes proferred would be sufficiently connected. Perhaps Gunther hopes that
political pressures will prevent the legislature from being this candid; however, the political
dynamic discussed in this Article puts that hope in doubt. See supra notes 75-93 and accom-
panying text.
210. For example, the state retains the power to certify any occupation to inform con-
sumers of the state's judgment of the qualifications of practitioners. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the state can institute universal licensing, using the power to
take away the license as a means of ensuring professional behavior. See infra note 223 and
accompanying text.
211. Barron, supra note 32, at 661.
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This Article already has examined the state interests in the contexts of
the Commerce Clause2 2 and commercial speech. 1 3 This section dis-
cusses in detail two justifications frequently posited by the state: the
state's interest in protecting the welfare of the members of the occupa-
tion, and the state's interest in protecting consumers.
A. Protecting the Producer
A desire to protect incumbent producers is not an illegitimate state
purpose. Nothing in the Constitution suggests that a state lacks the
power to take steps calculated to enrich barbers or members of other
occupations. As a general rule, however, that purpose alone should not
be enough to override the value of free competition. A contrary posi-
tion would render the value meaningless because all monopoly laws
enrich the existing members of the occupation. In addition, the state
retains the less restrictive means2 4 of direct subsidy, which it can use to
enrich whomever it chooses. Of course, the state may have to be more
explicit about its goals, since the purpose of a subsidy is often difficult
to camouflage.
The general rule that protection of the producers constitutes an
insufficient state interest to justify monopoly legislation should yield in
two situations. First, that interest should be sufficient if the proposed
legislation would correct defects in bargaining power. Second, it
should be sufficient to protect the reliance interest created by pre-ex-
isting monopoly laws.
The Court should not invalidate a statute that is rationally related"
to the legislature's stated purpose of redressing defects in bargaining
power.2 15 The main areas of concern should be labor-management re-
lations and similar environments in which unregulated conditions re-
quire individuals to contract with a small number of large
212. See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due
Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967). Struve advocates the use of less restrictive alterna-
tive analysis in economic due process cases and criticizes the Court's refusal to use that
analysis when it does so in cases involving many other constitutional values. See, e.g.,
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507-14 (1964) (travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (religion); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354-57 (interstate commerce);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) (association); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 63-66 (1960) (speech); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (privacy).
Several state courts, relying on their own state constitutions, currently use less restrictive
alternative analysis in reviewing economic legislation. See Developments, supra note 66, at
1470.
215. See generallyJ. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTER-




A state's interest in correcting defects in bargaining power should
be accorded special deference for several reasons. First, the Court must
endeavor to keep the new economic due process free from the taint of
the Lochner heritage. Second, the political process rationale for consti-
tutional scrutiny is weaker in cases involving defects in bargaining
power. In general, if the legislature rationally believes that a particular
statute would counteract a concentration of bargaining power, the
group burdened by the legislation probably would be an interest group
with a sufficiently direct stake in the matter to assure that its viewpoint
is presented to the legislature.217 Finally, it can be argued that the
Court should not invalidate such statutes because they implicate the
overall societal distribution of wealth and power, an issue that may be
too controversial and too complex for the Court to address in this con-
text. The power of judicial review probably can be rationed more ef-
fectively by concentrating on the protection of those liberties that over
the long run will tend to benefit virtually all citizens.
The other situation in which the state's interest in protecting pro-
ducers should be deemed sufficient to justify monopoly legislation
arises because of the thousands of monopoly laws already on the stat-
ute books. One might be tempted to urge the wholesale invalidation of
those laws. That unrealistic request, however, might create powerful
opposition to heightened judicial scrutiny of monopoly laws, and
thereby jeopardize the prospective declaration of an anti-monopoly
principle.218 The Court should accept the protection of state-created
reliance as a justification for the impairment of economic liberty.2 19 If
216. The theory that concentrated power for buyers in a market offsets power for sellers
has received a considerable degree of empirical support. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note
108, at 306-13.
217. The ease of access of established business interests to the political process when
redistributive issues are considered is noted in C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 193-
200 (1977).
218. See generall, Allen, The Judicial Questfor Penal Justice.- The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 530 (prospectivity rule encourages the making of new
law by reducing some of its social costs).
219. The modem Court has considered the retroactivity of constitutional decisions prin-
cipally in the context of criminal procedure. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), one
of the three criteria for determining whether a decision should apply retroactively was the
extent of reliance by law enforcement officers upon the old standards. Several older state
cases indicate that if economic rights have become vested in reliance upon a law, courts may
properly consider the serious results that would follow from a decision holding the law un-
constitutional. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Smith, 22 Colo. 534, 45 P. 357 (1896); Willis v.
St. Paul Sanitation Co., 48 Minn. 140, 50 N.W. I 110 (1892); Worthington v. District Court,
37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230 (1914); Home Tel. Co. v. People's Tel. and Tel. Co., 125 Tenn. 270,
141 S.W. 845 (1911); State exrel. Guerguin v. McAlister, 88 Tex. 284, 31 S.W. 187 (1895).
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the Court invalidated all pre-existing monopoly laws, its action would
produce harsh results. For example, it would be an extremely severe
action if the Court told a taxicab driver that the taxicab license
purchased with her life savings is only a worthless piece of paper.
Although the political dynamic discussed in this Article may pre-
vent retrospective application of the constitutional principle of free
competition, prospective declaration of that principle would convey
meaningful benefits upon citizens. One benefit, of course, is that pro-
spective application would prevent the situation from getting worse.
Moreover, changes in tastes and technology gradually should nullify
many effects of existing state-enforced monopolies. As the economy
develops, new opportunities will arise in previously unregulated areas
for individuals excluded from older occupations.
B. Protecting the Consumer
Legislatures enacting producer-monopoly statutes often attempt to
justify such statutes by arguing that they actually benefit consumers.
Although this Article has argued that producer-monopoly statutes
often harm consumers,220 the Court cannot disregard completely the
legislature's judgment regarding a particular statute. The Court must
examine a monopoly statute closely to ascertain the actual ability of the
statute to protect the consuming public. The constitutional value
would be diluted severely if the Court deferred to every legislative
statement of an interest in protecting consumers.
In order to review producer-monopoly statutes purportedly pro-
tecting consumers, the Court should employ a two-pronged test. Under
the first prong, the law must be necessary to further the state's interest
in protecting consumers.22' The less restrictive alternatives of certifica-
tion222 and universal licensing223 can protect consumers against their
own ignorance in judging goods and services; except in extraordinary
cases, the Court should hold that these alternatives are sufficient.
220. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
221. A similar test now governs in the Contracts Clause area. Justice Blackmun's plural-
ity opinion in United States Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) declared that a
state law which impaired a state contractual obligation must be "reasonable and necessary
to serve ... important purposes claimed by the State."
222. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
223. This Article does not argue that licensing per se violates the Constitution; instead, it
is restrictive and monopolistic licensing whose constitutionality is suspect. A state retains
the power to require licensing of all participants in the occupation and to construct an ad-
ministrative apparatus to handle public complaints against practitioners. Furthermore, a
state can discipline wrongdoers by revoking their licenses as long as the discipline is not
imposed in order to preclude competition.
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Under the second prong, the Court should insist that the statute
promote interests of overriding importance.224 An interest would have
overriding importance if it is a legitimate purpose and if the interest
were of such unusual weight that consistently recognizing it as overrid-
ing would not threaten the predominance of competition as the princi-
ple of allocation. Examples might include products with empirically
demonstrated safety risks or other similar risks that would not give the
consumer a second chance to correct an earlier mistake in judgment.1
2 5
Of course, the state still could pursue lesser interests by direct, non-
monopolistic regulation of business practices.
V. Conclusion
If decisions such as Lochner stalled societal progress, it is useful to
remember that other cases from that era, such as New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann,2 26 helped prevent a regression toward a medieval economy
of privileged merchants and guilds.227 One can feel quite comfortable
with the demise of the Lochner constitutional doctrine, and yet sense
the unreality of the judicial rhetoric in cases such as Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc."'8 and Ferguson v. Skrupa.2 29 Prevailing jurisprudence is
beginning to provide doctrinal support for the theory that monopoly
legislation, except where deliberately engineered to combat other con-
centrations of bargaining power, is an abuse of the power to regulate
economic activity.2 30 The ghost of Lochner thus far has prevented the
Court from openly recognizing that position under the Due Process
224. Presumably the "importance" prong of the test should serve a different function
than that served by the scrutiny of "legitimate" interests. It is desirable, therefore, to state
the requirement as "an interest of overriding importance." The court would be hesitant ever
to declare a legitimate state interest unimportant; the real issue is the importance of the state
interest in relation to the countervailing value.
225. See Barron, supra note 32, at 642, for a discussion of the "no second chance" ration-
ale for licensing.
226. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
227. See W. GELLHORN, supra note 36, at 113-18. Gellhorn describes the medieval
guilds of merchants and craftsmen. According to Gelihorn, they were originally formed for
the purpose of protecting the reputations of their members and imposed few barriers to
entry. "[B]y the middle of the fourteenth century, however, there were thinly disguised evi-
dences of an aim to restrict competition by restricting membership, and a century later the
disguises were frankly discarded." Id at 113.
228. 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955) (Oklahoma statute enforcing monopoly for certain ac-
tivities of ophthalmologists and optometrists upheld since it was designed to protect consum-
ers and, if ineffective, consumers had adequate remedy at the polls).
229. 372 U.S. 726, 728-33 (1963) (Kansas statute enforcing attorneys' monopoly on debt
adjustment practice upheld under same rationale set forth in Lee Optical).
230. As discussed above, there should be limited exceptions to this anti-monopoly princi-
ple. See supra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
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Clause.23' As a result, those values have had to find indirect expression
in judicial decisions involving the Contracts, Taking, Commerce, and
Freedom of Speech Clauses, as well as in the constitutions of several
states. 232 An explicit due process holding affirming the value of free
and open competition for society's lawful occupations must await full
judicial recognition that the stream of monopoly legislation flows from
an unchecked political dynamic not consciously willed by anyone
rather than from error in the opinions of the majority.
231. Although this Article has focused on the Due Process Clause, one also could recog-
nize free competition as a principle protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (5-4
decision rejecting the argument that state-enforced monopoly violates the Fourteenth
Amendment). One concerned with excessive corporate power might find the Privileges and
Immunities Clause intuitively appealing, since the Court has held that corporations are not
protected by it. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); Hemphill v. Orlaff, 277 U.S.
537, 548-50 (1928). However, the ability of all corporations to freely compete is itself an
important check on the abuse of corporate power.
232. See Developments, supra note 66, at 1478-82.
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